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Abstract 
This paper uses panel data for 116 countries over the period 1995-2016 to investigate 
the heterogeneity of the debt-growth nexus across countries and the factors underlying 
it. In the first step, the grouped fixed effects (GFE) estimator proposed by Bonhomme 
and Manresa (2015) is used to classify countries into groups, with group membership 
being endogenously determined. In the second step, a multinomial logit model is used 
to explore the drivers of the heterogeneity detected, among them the quality of 
institutions, the composition of debt-funded public expenditure, the relative public and 
private indebtedness, and the maturity of debt. Finally, the underlying factors 
explaining the time-varying impact of public debt on growth in the country groups 
identified is also investigated. 
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1. Introduction  
The nexus between public debt and economic growth, a traditional focus of study for 
economists, has recently undergone a notable revival fuelled by the substantial 
deterioration of public finances in many economies after the global financial and economic 
crisis of 2008-2009. According to Fitch Ratings, government debt hit $66 trillion through 
the end of 2018, or about 80% of global GDP1. 
A decade after the global financial crisis, government debt-to-GDP ratios are still above 
their pre-crisis levels. These high levels of public sector indebtedness involve risks 
especially for advanced and emerging economies. On the one hand, as global monetary 
conditions tighten, the debt burden may grow and rollover risks increase. On the other 
hand, the debt burden limits the ability of governments to provide support to the economy 
in the event of a downturn or a financial crisis. Although there is widespread agreement 
about the potentially adverse consequences of unparalleled levels of public debt for 
economies’ growth, few macroeconomic policy debates have generated as much 
controversy as the austerity argument [see Guajardo et al. (2014), Jordà and Taylor (2016) 
or Alesina et al. (2019a, 2019b)], especially in the current context of waning momentum in 
the major economies.  
From an empirical point of view, the existing literature has grouped studies into two 
strands (see Mitze and Matz, 2015). The “first generation” strand includes the works by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Pattillo et al., (2011), Lof and Malinen (2014) and Woo and 
Kumar (2015), among others. This strand focused mainly on the nonlinear effects in the 
1 The Global Debt Database published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows similar figures. According to 
the IMF, global debt has reached an all-time high of $184 trillion in nominal terms, the equivalent of 225% of GDP in 
2017. However, of the global total of $184 trillion in debt at the end of 2017, close to two-thirds was nonfinancial private 
debt and the remaining one-third was public debt.  
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debt-growth relationship and predicted an inverted U-shape relationship between the two 
variables (debt begins to harm economic growth when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a 
certain threshold – 90%, according to the seminal paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)). 
The “second generation” strand goes beyond the nonlinearities in the relationship and 
focuses instead on the heterogeneity of debt-growth nexuses across countries [Ghosh et al. 
(2013), Pescatori et al. (2014), Edberhardt and Presbitero (2015), Markus and Rainer (2016), 
Chudik et al. (2017), Chiu and Lee (2017) or Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017, 
2018a)]. The studies in the second strand acknowledge that the effects of public debt on 
growth may vary depending on country-specific macroeconomic, financial, and institutional 
variables.  
In this context, the current paper belongs to the above-mentioned “second generation” of 
studies and aims to contribute to the existing literature in three respects. First, the 
originality of the analysis arises from the adoption of a recently developed method from 
the panel time series literature: the grouped fixed effects (GFE) estimator proposed by 
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
apply the GFE methodology to examine whether the debt-growth relationship differs 
across groups of countries, with the pattern of heterogeneity being endogenously 
determined by the data2. Second, the GFE methodology will also be used to examine 
whether the impact of debt on economic growth changes over time by estimating group-
specific time-varying coefficients. Although it is also widely agreed that heterogeneities in 
the debt-growth relationship occur not only across countries but also over time, this issue 
has hardly been studied by the literature (the exceptions include Yang and Su (2018) and 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018b))3. The third contribution of this paper is to 
analyse the drivers of the heterogeneous impact of debt on economic growth. To this end, 
we first explore the determinants of group membership, making use of a multinomial logit 
regression model to assess the role of five types of variables4: (1) the quality of institutions, 
2 The GFE estimator takes into account the possibility that different countries experience distinct dynamics in the debt-
growth relationship, with the group-specific time patterns and individual group membership being left unrestricted and 
estimated from the data. Furthermore, the GFE estimator arguably deals better with endogeneity due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
3 Yang and Su (2018) extend the regression kink model of Hansen (2017) and find clear evidence that the debt-to-GDP 
threshold is time-varying and state-dependent (however, a limitation of their work is that the choice of debt-threshold 
determinants is arbitrary). While Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018b) empirically investigate the short and the long 
run impact of public debt on economic growth by applying the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing 
approach. 
4 In a recent paper, Fatás et al. (2019) point out that treating debt as a black box and imposing the restriction that any given 
level of debt has the same consequence on economic growth, regardless of its structure, is simplistic. In particular, they 
state that one of the reasons why it is difficult to identify common patterns and to pin down the causal effect of debt on 
growth is that not all debts are equal, and factors such as (1) what the debt was used for, (2) who holds government debt, 
(3) its currency composition, and (4) its maturity are key elements that can affect fiscal vulnerabilities and the possible 
reactions of government and private agents to future changes in debt. We tried to find data for the four variables, but 
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(2) the composition of public expenditure that is funded with debt, (3) relative public 
indebtedness, (4) relative private indebtedness, and (5) the maturity of debt5. We then 
analyse the role of these variables in explaining the time-varying impact of public debt on 
growth in the country groups identified. 
This paper aims to fill these gaps in the literature by focusing on a sample of 116 countries 
(advanced, emerging and developing countries) over the period 1995-2016.  The main 
results show that the relationship between public debt and growth varies across countries. 
In particular, the GFE estimator endogenously splits the sample into seven groups of 
countries that have dissimilar time patterns and a different estimated impact of a debt 
change on economic growth (ranging between -0.43 and -0.031). When analysing the 
heterogeneous time-varying impact of public debt on growth, our results indicate that the 
debt-growth relationship is crucially mitigated by the quality of a country’s institutions and 
intensified by the level of both public and private indebtedness and the maturity of debt. 
The type of expenditure that is funded with debt also influences that relationship 
(negatively in the case of unproductive spending, and positively in the case of productive 
spending). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the rationale for our 
empirical approach on the basis of the results of some preliminary descriptive analyses. 
Section 3 introduces the analytical framework. Section 4 describes the data used in the 
analysis. The econometric methodology is explained in Section 5. Empirical results are 
presented in Section 6, while Section 7 explores the determinants of group membership 
and the time-varying impact of public debt on growth. Finally, some concluding remarks 
and policy implications are offered in Section 8. 
 
2. Descriptive analysis 
In what follows, we provide some descriptive analyses highlighting the cross-country 
heterogeneity in the evolution of sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio in the 116 countries in our 
sample (see Appendix 1) over the period 1995-2016. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the 
average debt ratio in the three groups of countries into which the sample can be split, 
obtained data only for the first (what the debt was used for) and the fourth (debt maturity) factors mentioned. 
Nevertheless, we have also included variables that proxy the quality of the institutions and the relative ratio of both 
private and public debt. 
5 As a proxy for the maturity of debt, we use short-term debt, expressed as a percentage of total external debt. 
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following the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification: advanced economies (AE), 
emerging market economies (EM), and low income developing countries (LIDC). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We can observe that, from the outbreak of the global financial crisis (2008-09) until the end 
of the sample period in 2016, on average, global general government debt has risen by over 
20% of GDP in advanced economies and by around 13% of GDP in emerging markets, 
reaching a post-war high [see Bredenkamp et al., 2019 and Yared (2019)], whilst in low-
income developing countries (with only a few exceptions) new debt accumulation was 
contained during the crisis, thanks largely to the debt relief efforts of the late-1990s and 
early 2000s6 (see Eichengreen et al., 2019) and did not experience an increase until 2012 (on 
average, 14% of GDP). These increases have given rise to average public debt-to-GDP 
ratios of around 75%, 54%, and 56% in advanced economies, emerging markets and 
developing countries respectively at the end of 2016. 
However, as public debt increases are far from being homogeneous within the three groups 
of countries, the debt-to-GDP ratios are highly dispersed in the different groups over the 
sample period. More specifically, despite their relatively moderate average values at the end 
of 2016, debt-to-GDP ratios registered values above 100% in eight advanced economies 
and above 90% in three. Moreover, two emerging market and four low-income developing 
countries were also above 100%.   
Japan registered the highest government debt (not only in our sample, but also in the 
world) at 236% of its GDP in 2016 (although, notably, Japan is also one of the world’s 
largest economies and its share of public debt held by non-residents is traditionally very low 
– around 5-7% – which reduces its vulnerability). It is followed by Greece, which is still 
recovering from the effects of its economic crisis and subsequent bailout, at 183%. It is 
noticeable that five euro area countries also registered ratios above or close to 100% at the 
end of 2016: Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Spain and France, with figures of 132%, 130%, 
106%, 99% and 97% respectively. Finally, several Caribbean and African countries also had 
high national debts at the end of the sample period, including Barbados (149%), Jamaica 
(114%), Belize (96%), Republic of Congo (129%), Cape Verde (128%), Mauritania (100%), 
Sudan (100%) and Egypt (97%). 
6 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the associated Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
explain these figures since recipient countries were required to establish a track-record of strong policy performance 
under IMF and World Bank supported programs before receiving large write-downs of both official bilateral and 
multilateral debt. 
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Of the world’s major economic powers, the United States registered the highest national 
debt at 107% of its GDP in 2016. China, the world’s second-largest economy and home to 
the world’s largest population, had a public debt ratio of just 44% of its GDP at the end of 
20167. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, also had a relatively low sovereign debt ratio at 
68%. Among the 116 countries in our sample, at the other end of the scale, Estonia 
registered the lowest sovereign-debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (9%), followed by three sub-
Saharan African countries: Botswana (16%), Congo Democratic Republic (19%) and 
Nigeria (20%). 
All in all, the above figures indicate that the evolution of the public ratio of indebtedness 
presents very different patterns – not only across the 116 countries in our sample, but also 
within the three groups into which the sample is divided according to the IMF income-
based classification. This suggests that the use of the GFE methodology, which leaves 
group membership unrestricted rather than imposing it ex-ante, may represent a more useful 
tool for capturing those heterogeneities8. Moreover, they also provide a good reason for 
examining whether the differences in the relationship between debt and economic growth 
depend on factors others than per capita income, such as the institutional environment, the 
composition of debt-funded public expenditure, the relative ratio of private and public 
indebtedness, or debt maturity. 
 
3. Analytical framework 
Following Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017 and 2018a), the initial empirical 
specification is derived from the neoclassical growth model of Solow augmented with 
public debt, where the growth rate of real per capita GDP for a given country i in time t 
(gti) is given by: 
7 However, it is noticeable that China alone accounts for almost three-quarters of the increase in global private 
nonfinancial debt since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, which represents over 200% of its GDP (see 
Bredenkamp et al., 2019) 
8 Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017 and 2018a) examined the heterogeneity in the public debt-economic growth 
nexus in EMU countries by means of time-series techniques. In principle, in those papers they are able to analyse each 
country separately by allowing complete individual heterogeneity, but this approach is not entirely practical, for several 
reasons: (1) individual estimations may be rather inefficient since they do not make use of cross-section information and 
(2) examining countries separately fails to capture any common patterns. On the other hand, much of the previous 
literature relies on panel data techniques and obtains an average relationship for a given group of countries. Therefore, 
since it is very important not only to impose some structure on individual heterogeneity but also to allow for different 
relationships within the sample, the grouped fixed effect (GFE) estimator seems well suited for the purposes of this 
paper.  
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j
g y X dα γ δ β ε−
=
= + + + +∑    (1) 
where yit-1 is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP (to capture the “catch-up effect” or 
conditional convergence of the economy to its steady state), Xijt (j=1, …, n) is a set of 
control variables, dti is the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and itε denotes the error term. 
Regarding Xit, we consider a set of explanatory variables that have been shown to be 
consistently associated with growth in the literature9: population growth rate as a 
percentage (POPGRit); the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP (GCFit); life expectancy 
at birth, a proxy for the level of human capital (HKit)10; openness to trade, measured by the 
sum of exports and imports over GDP (OPENit); and the GDP deflator inflation rate, a 
measure of macroeconomic instability and uncertainty (INFit). 
In the economic growth literature, the rate of growth of labour used in the production 
process and the accumulation of physical capital (investment) are the key determinants of 
growth (Solow (1956) or Frankel (1962)). Therefore, population growth (POPGRt) and the 
ratio of gross fixed capital formation to real GDP (GCFt) are used to proxy country size 
and the rate of labour growth and the accumulation of the physical capital stock 
respectively.  
A proxy of human capital (HKt) is included to reflect the notion that countries with an 
abundance of human capital are more likely to be able to attract investors, absorb ideas 
from the rest of the world, and engage in innovation activities (Grossman and Helpman, 
1991) Trade openness (OPENt) is posited to boost productivity through transfers of 
knowledge and efficiency gains (Seghezza and Baldwin, 2008). Finally, with regard to the 
inflation rate (INFt), it has been argued that inflation is a good macroeconomic indicator of 
how the government manages the economy [see Fischer (1993) or Barro (2003), among 
other authors] and that low inflation brings about economic efficiency because, through the 
price mechanism, economies are able to allocate scarce resources to their best economic 
use (World Bank, 1990).  
 
  
9 See Aghion and Howitt (2009) for a comprehensive account of the most important contributions and debates on 
growth. 
10 This proxy is also used by Sachs and Warner (1997).  
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4. Data 
We use annual data for 116 countries (advanced economies, emerging market economies 
and low-income developing countries) over the period 1995-2016 (see Appendix 1). 
To maintain as much homogeneity as possible for a sample of 116 countries over the 
course of two decades, we use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as our 
primary source. We then strengthen our data with the use of supplementary information 
from the International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics and World 
Economic Outlook, October 2018). As mentioned above, we first use per capita GDP at 
2010 market prices, population growth rate, the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP, an 
index of human capital, openness to trade and GDP deflator inflation to examine the 
impact of debt on economic growth. The precise definitions and sources of the variables 
are presented in Appendix 2. In the second step, we make use of variables that measure the 
quality of institutions, the composition of public expenditure, the relative ratio of both 
public and private indebtedness, and debt maturity as potential drivers of the relationship 
in the different groups of countries found. 
With regard to the variables that measure the quality of institutions, in this paper we rely on 
the definition of economic institutions proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2005b) where 
economic institutions are identified with the structure of property rights and access to 
economic resources. Thus, good economic institutions are ones that provide security of 
property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section 
of society. However, measuring the quality of institutions is a challenging task. It is 
common practice in the literature to measure it in terms of perceptions, which may not 
necessarily reflect the quality of the law but rather the actual workings of the economy. So, 
in this paper, to capture differences in the quality of country governance, we adopt a 
comprehensive composite index, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator 
(WGI), which offers better time-variate characteristics than other governance measures. 
The WGI index covers six broad dimensions of governance for over 200 countries since 
1996, and summarizes views on the quality of country governance provided by a number of 
survey organizations, non-governmental organizations, commercial business information 
providers, and public sector organizations worldwide. It follows the methodology of 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) and is published annually by the World Bank. The six governance 
indicators it contains are: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of 
violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control 
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of corruption. This paper focuses on the average of the last four of these indicators11, 
which captures the quality of economic and administrative institutions (the definition of 
each of the four indicators included in our average measure is presented in Appendix 3). In 
particular, these indicators try to capture how the economic structure is able to deliver a 
level-playing field for all economic actors, ensure that rent extraction and waste of 
resources is limited, and provide sound economic incentives for encouraging people to 
invest, innovate, save, solve problems of collective actions and provide public goods. 
Therefore, in each year (following Chong and Gradstein (2007) and Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012)), we take the simple average of the four components of the WGI presented in 
Appendix 3 for each country. We then rescale this raw score so that it lies between zero 
and one by subtracting the minimum score from it and dividing the result by the maximum 
score minus the minimum score (this variable is named “government quality indicator” 
(GQIt) in our analysis). 
Data regarding private debt (PRDEBTt) have been drawn from the Global Debt Database. 
This database offers the total gross debt of the (private and public) nonfinancial sector for 
an unbalanced panel of 190 countries (see Mbaye et al., 2018) and for the 116 countries of 
our sample we have selected the variable total private debt as a percentage of GDP. This 
variable is calculated as the sum of two components12: (1) bank loans to domestic 
households and nonfinancial corporations, drawn from the IMF’s Standardized Reporting 
Forms (SRFs) and International Financial Statistics (IFS) and (2) the outstanding stock of 
debt securities issued (on the domestic and international markets) by non-financial 
corporations, calculated based on securities issuance data from Dealogic database13. Then, 
as explained in Appendix 3, much as the World Bank classifies countries by income (see 
Fantom and Serajuddi, 2016), we have classified them as low indebted, lower middle 
indebted, upper middle indebted, and high indebted, the cut-off points between each of the 
groups being the first, the second and the third quartiles. To this end, we use yearly data to 
create two dummy variables representing our proxies of the relative public and private 
indebtedness: (DQPDt) and (DQPRDt), respectively. These dummy variables take values 
from 1 to 4, corresponding to the low indebted, lower middle indebted, upper middle 
11 Following Helliwell et al. (2014) the six composite measures reported by the World Bank are divided into two groups 
and only the average of the second group of indicators (which contains four measures primarily concerned with the 
quality of the delivery of government services: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the control of 
corruption) is included in our analysis. The first group of two indicators measures the state of democracy and other 
aspects of the electoral process (voice and accountability, and political stability and absence of violence).  
12 However, this does not include cross-border bank loans from the Bank for International Settlements dataset because 
they were not available for all the countries in our sample.  
13 Outstanding debt securities are calculated on the basis of maturity at issuance.   
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indebted, and high indebted categories using public and private debt-to-GDP ratios 
respectively. 
With regard to the debt maturity variable, we use short-term debt (STDt), expressed as 
percentage of total external debt, as a proxy. Data have been obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators and from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS) database provided by the IMF.  
Finally, the International Monetary Fund Government Financial Statistics was the source 
used to collect data regarding government expenditure by purpose. This dataset is usually 
known as the classification of the functions of government (COFOG) and divides 
government expenditure into 10 categories: (GF01) on general public services, (GF02) on 
defence, (GF03) on public order and safety, (GF04) on economic affairs, (GF05) on 
environment protection, (GF06) on housing and community amenities, (GF07) on health, 
(GF08) on recreation, culture and religion, (GF09) on education, and (GF10) on social 
protection. A more detailed overview of the items included in each category is presented in 
Appendix 414.  
To produce a balance panel without missing values, we apply two complementary 
procedures: the technique of multiple imputation developed by King et al. (2001) (which 
permits the approximation of missing data and allows us to obtain better estimates) and the 
simultaneous nearest-neighbour predictors proposed by Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
(which infers omitted values from patterns detected in other simultaneous time series). 
 
5. Econometric Methodology 
Given the relatively small sample available, we use panel data econometrics to combine the 
power of cross section averaging with all the subtleties of temporal dependence (see 
Baltagi, 2008)15. Indeed, this methodology has already been extensively used in the 
literature.  
5.1. Time series properties 
Since the appropriate econometric treatment of a model depends crucially on the pattern of 
stationarity and non-stationarity of the variables under study, before carrying out the 
14 In each country, expenditure in the different groups is presented as a percentage of GDP. 
15The main advantages over single cross-sections or time series data are the following: a) a more accurate inference of 
model parameters, b) a greater capacity for capturing the complexity of economic relationships, c) more informative 
results, d) a greater ability to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity, and e) its simpler computation and 
statistical inference. See Hsiao (2003) for an analysis of the advantages and limitations of using panel datasets. 
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estimation we perform a variety of unit root tests in panel datasets. Specifically, we use the 
Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000), Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003), 
and Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) tests. The results of these tests16 decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for git, INFit, POPGRit and GCFit (indicating that they are 
stationary in levels, i. e., I(0)), while they do not reject the null for yit, dit, OPENit and HKit 
(suggesting that these variables can be treated as first-difference stationary, i. e., I(1)) 
5.2. Empirical model 
Given that our dependent variable is stationary (i.e., its statistical properties such as mean, 
variance, autocorrelation, etc., remain constant over time), we cannot explain it with non-
stationary variables (whose statistical properties change over time). Additionally, if the 
variables in the regression model are not stationary, then the standard assumptions for 
asymptotic analysis will not be valid and we cannot undertake hypothesis tests about the 
regression parameters. Therefore, by differentiating the non-stationary variables we 
transform them into stationary variables. 
As a result of the time series properties of our data, the baseline empirical model is as 
follows:  
1 1 2 3 4 5it i it it it it it it it itg g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF dα φ δ δ δ δ δ β ε−= + + + ∆ + ∆ + + + ∆ +   (2) 
where∆  denotes the first difference operator.  
Note that model (2) is quite different from model (1), which is commonly used in the 
literature, especially regarding the variables yit-1, HKit, OPENit and dit, since we find that 
they are non-stationary and therefore enter our model in first differences. As argued in 
Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016), by rewriting equation (1) as (3) 
1
1 1
l l
s s ns ns
it i it ij ijt ij ijt it t
j j
g y X X dα γ δ δ β ε−
= =
= + + + + +∑ ∑      (3) 
(where sijtX  and 
ns
ijtX denote the stationary and non-stationary explanatory variables 
respectively), we can compare (3) with our equation (2), which has 1 1it itg y− −= ∆ instead of
1ity − , itd∆  instead of itd  and 
ns
ijtX∆  instead of 
ns
ijtX as explanatory variables due to non-
stationarity. The interpretation of the estimated parameters is the same in both models, but 
that ofφ , 2 ,δ 3δ and β changes. 
16 The results of the tests are available upon request from the authors. 
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To estimate model (2), we initially consider two basic panel regression methods. The first 
one is the pooled-OLS and is based on the following assumptions about unobserved terms: 
 iα  is uncorrelated with :itx ( ) 0it iE x α =  
 1( , , , , , , )it it it it it it it itx g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF d−= ∆ ∆ ∆  
 ( ) 0it itE x ε =  ( itx  predetermined) 
In this first estimation method, the data for different countries are pooled together and the 
equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The second method is the fixed-effects (FE) method, based on the following assumptions 
about unobserved terms ( iα  and itε ):  
 iα  is freely correlated with 
 1( , , , , , , )it it it it it it it itx g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF d−= ∆ ∆ ∆  
 ( ) 0it isE x ε =  for s=1, …,T (strict exogeneity) 
Therefore, this second estimation method accounts for differences between countries and 
the constant terms iα  are allowed to vary between them. These constant terms stand for 
all unobserved aspects that distinguish the countries from each other (i. e., they capture 
country heterogeneity). 
 
5.3. Exploring the possibility of heterogeneous effects  
However, the originality of the analysis presented in this paper does not arise from the use 
of panel data techniques, but from exploring the possibility of heterogeneous effects of 
debt variations on economic growth, accounting for both varying and unvarying 
heterogeneity between countries using a recently developed method from the panel time 
series literature: the Grouped Fixed Effect (GFE) approach, proposed by Bonhomme and 
Manresa (2015)17. The GFE estimator relaxes the strict assumption that all countries follow 
the same time trend, and requires only that all countries within a group follow the same 
time pattern over time. Nevertheless, the GFE estimator restricts the pattern to being the 
same for all countries within a group, but allows different groups to have fully distinct time 
patterns. 
17 This estimator has been used in Grunewald et al. (2017) to investigate the relationship between inequality and carbon 
dioxide emissions and by Oberlander et al. (2017) to assess the distinct effects of social globalization and trade openness 
on national trends in markers of diet quality. 
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In contrast to the country fixed effects estimator, the GFE estimator can control for 
unobservable time-varying country characteristics that follow a group-specific time pattern. 
The main identifying assumption is that the number of distinct country-specific time 
patterns of unobserved heterogeneity is equal to the number of groups. In other words, all 
countries have to follow one of the group specific time-varying paths of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
An additional important feature of the GFE estimator is that group membership of the 
countries in our sample is not pre-determined, but is estimated according to a least-squares 
criterion. Countries whose time profiles of the outcome variable (growth rate of real per 
capita GDP) – net of the effect of covariates – are most similar are grouped together. 
Assume that the countries in our sample are categorized in a number of groups indexed by 
j = 1, …, J. The number of groups J must be small compared to the number of countries.  
Finally, a further advantage of the GFE estimator is that the time-varying GFE are better 
suited to deal with endogeneity in the presence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. 
In this case, our regression equation takes the following specification: 
1 1 2 3 4 5 iit it it it it it it it j t it
g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GCF dφ δ δ δ δ δ β α ε−= + + ∆ + ∆ + + + ∆ + +   (4) 
where 
ij t
α denotes the group-specific time fixed effect which includes group fixed effects as 
well as time fixed effects. The estimator is described in detail in Appendix 5.  
 
6. Empirical Results18 
Table 1 shows the estimation results using the OLS, panel FE and GFE methodologies. It 
can be seen that the growth rate of real per capita GDP is negatively associated with 
changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Compared to OLS and FE specifications, the 
coefficient of changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio shrinks slightly in magnitude in the 
GFE estimation, but remains statistically significant. An additional point on the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a reduction in the growth rate by 0.072. A one 
standard deviation increase (8.93) in the public debt-to-GDP ratio reduces the rate of 
growth by about 0.64 on average, equivalent to a decrease of about 29%19. 
18 In each model, we focus our comments on the variation in public debt in order to investigate its effect on growth, 
summarizing the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader should browse through Tables 1 and 2 for a 
detailed account of the impact of other explanatory variables on the growth rate. 
19 The mean rate of growth during the sample period is 2.24, being 0.64 the 29% of it.  
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It is noticeable that the fit of the overall regressions significantly increases from 0.265 for 
the OLS and FE specifications to 0.544 for the GFE. Note also that the values of the 
objective function (the Bayesian information criterion, BIC) of the GFE estimation is 
lower than the values of the objective function of the OLS and fixed effects estimation, 
suggesting that some cross-country heterogeneity is time-varying in our sample and 
justifying the appropriate use of the GFE estimator. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The GFE model uses seven groups (the number being selected using information on the 
change in the criterion function). The estimated classification of the countries belonging to 
each group is shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. 
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here] 
Next, in order to investigate whether variations in the public debt-to-GDP ratio have a 
different effect on the rate of growth in different groups, we estimated a new model that 
allows for specific slopes by including interactions of the variable itd∆  with the group 
indicator variables. Table 3 presents the impact of changes in debt-to-GDP ratio on real 
per capita GDP growth for the seven detected groups in the sample20.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
It can be observed that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant for 
all groups and that the estimated impact ranges between -0.43 in Group 1 to -0.031 in 
Group 721.  
Group 1 and Group 2, the ones with the highest effect of a debt change on economic 
growth (-0.43 and -0.23 respectively) are composed entirely by advanced and emerging 
market economies: four post-Soviet states in the case of Group 1 −three Baltic states, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are now advanced economies and members of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and one Eastern Europe country which 
is an emerging market economy (Ukraine)−; and five East Asia & Pacific countries, one 
European and one sub-Saharan African country in the case of Group 2. Of these, two are 
advanced economies (Republic of Korea and Singapore) and five emerging market 
20 For expository convenience, we have named the endogenously identified groups according to their estimated impact, 
being Group 1 the one with the highest estimated impact and Group 7 the one with the lowest estimated impact.  
21 These results imply that a one standard deviation increase on the public debt-to-GDP ratio reduces the rate of growth 
by about 60% in Group 1 while the same increase generates only a 10% decrease in Group 7.  
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economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Russia22 and Botswana). A common 
characteristic of countries that belong to Groups 1 and 2 is that they present low or 
moderate levels of public debt-to-GDP throughout the sample. The only exception is 
Singapore, with an average ratio above 90% throughout the period.  
The estimated impact of a debt change on economic growth declines noticeably in Group 3 
(-0.14), which includes 16 countries: two post-Soviet states from Eastern Europe, 
Moldova23 a low-income developing country and Belarus, an emerging market economy; 
four European countries, three of them considered emerging markets (Turkey, Bulgaria 
and Romania, the last two are members of the European Union) and one advanced 
economy that is a member of the EMU (Slovak Republic); nine Latin American countries 
(Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru) 
which are considered emerging economies by the IMF with the exception of Honduras (a 
low-income developing country); and one sub-Saharan African country (Namibia) which is 
also an emerging market economy. With the exception of Brazil, all of them also present 
moderate levels of public debt during the sample period24. 
Group 4 and Group 5 present lower impacts (-0.11 and -0.09 respectively) and mainly 
include advanced and emerging market economies (though there are also some low-income 
developing countries), but the average ratios of both public and private debt are much 
higher25. Specifically, Group 4 comprises three advanced economies that belong to the 
EMU (Ireland26, Luxembourg and Malta); one Latin American country (Dominican 
Republic), an emerging market economy, and two sub-Saharan African countries 
(Seychelles, an emerging market country and Cape Verde a low-income developing 
country). Group 5, with 40 countries, is the largest, followed by Group 7 with 31 countries 
– 21 European countries (12 advanced economies that belong to the EMU: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
22 Russia is one of the EM economies that now issues almost all its debt in local currency. While this shift has reduced 
currency risk, it has also fostered an increase in the share of debt held by non-residents (who are traditionally more 
volatile)  
23 Fraud in Moldova’s banking system led to a large government bailout in 2014. 
24 However, Brazil made a shift to issue its debt in local currency, which has reduced currency risk. Conversely, in 
Argentina, despite having a lower level of public debt, indebtedness may represent a risk since it is mainly external and 
can lead to a balance of payments or a currency crisis. Indeed, Argentina has recently experienced significant capital 
outflows (a similar crisis took place in Turkey, which is also in Group 3). 
25The average debt ratio of 100% is surpassed by one country in Group 4 (Seychelles) and by six in Group 5 (Japan, 
Mauritania, Greece, Jamaica, Italy and Belgium); whilst this ratio of 80% is surpassed by one country in Group 4 (Cape 
Verde) and by five in group 5 (Barbados, Belize, Canada, Comoros, and Portugal).   
26 In Ireland (jointly with Luxembourg and Malta), the effect of a debt change on economic growth is higher than in most 
of the euro area countries (the majority belong to Group 5). The fact that exposure to foreign creditors is traditionally 
very high in Ireland (more than 40%) and that a major banking crisis led to a government bailout in 2010 (the debt-to-
GDP ratio surpassed 100%  between 2011 and 2014 ) might partially explain this difference. 
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Slovenia and Spain; six EU countries outside the currency union: the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, advanced economies, and Croatia and Hungary, 
emerging market economies; and three other European advanced economies that do not 
belong to the EU: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland; two advanced North American 
economies (Canada and the United States); three East Asia and Pacific countries (Japan and 
New Zealand, advanced economies, and Fiji , an emerging market economy); eight Latin 
American and Caribbean countries (the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, El Salvador, Jamaica 
and Mexico, emerging markets, and Nicaragua and Haiti, low-income developing 
countries); three Middle East and North African countries (Israel, Algeria and Iran), the 
first being an advanced economy and the other two emerging markets belonging to the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and three sub-Saharan 
African countries (South Africa27, an emerging market, and Comoros and Mauritania low-
income developing countries).  
Finally, in Groups 6 and 7 the estimated effect of a debt change on economic growth 
registers the lowest values (-0.04 and -0.03 respectively). They are composed entirely of 
emerging markets and low-income developing countries with somewhat more moderate 
debt levels, especially in Group 7. More specifically, Group 6 comprises 12 countries, and 
some of them with high public debt ratios28: eight sub-Saharan African countries (Congo 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Niger and Gabon) that with the exception of Gabon (an emerging market and member of 
OPEC) are low-income developing countries; three Middle East and North African 
countries (Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia – emerging markets and, in the case of the 
last two, oil exporters (Saudi Arabia also belongs to OPEC) and one South Asia low-
income developing country (Nepal).  Group 7, the second-largest with 31 countries, 
includes29: 14 sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Eswatini, Mauritius, and 
27 South Africa, and to a lesser extent Mexico are also among the EMs countries that made a shift in their debt structure 
to local currency. 
28 This is the case of Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar and the Gambia. It is noticeable that, in the Republic 
of Congo (an OPEC member) the collapse of the oil price in 2012-2013 was a major factor in the debt increase that led 
the country into default with external creditors and face difficult restructuring discussions; however, fraud and corruption 
were a major factor of fiscal deterioration in other countries such as the Gambia. 
29 Although average public debt-to-GDP ratios are more moderate than in Groups 4, 5 and 6, they are also high in some 
countries (e.g. Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and 
Sudan). It is noticeable that in oil exporter countries (e.g., Egypt and Sudan) the fall of the oil price in 2012-2013 was a 
major driver of debt increase; however, fiscal positions also deteriorated after 2012 in some diversified exporter 
economies. The factors of declining fiscal positions are quite diverse, and include current spending overruns (e.g. Ghana 
and Kyrgyz Republic) or spending on major projects (e.g. Cameroon, Kenya and Rwanda). However, China and India 
(also in Group 7) are among the largest EMs that now issue virtually all their debt in local currency and have become 
(jointly with Brazil) the dominant source of bilateral financing to LIDC, who have seen a dramatic shift in their creditor 
base. 
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Senegal) which are low-income developing countries (oil exporters in the case of Sudan and 
Nigeria, which is also an OPEC member) with the exception of the last three, which are 
emerging markets; four Middle East and North African countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan 
and Tunisia) which are emerging markets (Egypt being an oil exporter); five Latin 
American and Caribbean countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Uruguay and Guyana) 
which are emerging markets with the exception of Guyana (a low-income developing 
country); three South Asian countries (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka);  two East Asia and 
Pacific countries (China and Philippines) which are also emerging markets; and, finally, 
three European countries: two post-Soviet states (Kazakhstan, an emerging market and oil 
exporter, and Kyrgyz Republic, a low-income developing country) and an European Union 
country that is classified as an emerging market economy (Poland). 
So, all in all, we observe that the effect of a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio on 
GDP growth is lower in developing and emerging market economies (where, in general, 
the level of public indebtedness is also lower) than in advanced economies that record the 
highest ratios of public debt (see Figure 1)30. However, since the richest countries in the 
world do not belong to Group 1 (the ones with the highest effect of a debt change on 
economic growth), but to Group 5, there must be other reasons that might explain group 
membership. For this reason, in the next section we examine the relevance of the 
institutions, the type of expenditure that is funded with debt, the relative level of private 
and public indebtedness, and debt maturity in explaining the debt-growth relationship.    
Moreover, we investigate whether the heterogeneous impact detected has a different 
pattern over time by estimating a new model that allows for specific time-varying slopes 
including interactions of the variable itd∆  with the group indicator and year dummies
31. 
Figure 3 shows the estimated evolution of the coefficient of changes in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio on economic growth by country groups over time. As can be seen, there is 
time-varying heterogeneity within and between country groups. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
It can be observed that the more volatile the estimated effect over time (measured by the 
standard deviation), the higher the impact. It is quite stable in Groups 6 and 7 and records 
the highest volatility in Group 1. It is also noticeable that, in four out of the seven groups 
30 The gap between the debt of the G20 advanced and emerging market economies is still significant, exceeding 90% of 
GDP on average, while low-income developing countries are even clearer outliers, accounting for less than 1% of the 
global debt – well below their share of output (see Mbaye et al., 2018). 
31 The estimation results are not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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(1, 2, 3 and 5), the negative estimated effect of a debt change on economic growth reaches 
its maximum value (in absolute terms) during the period 2010-2012, coinciding with the 
Great Recession (2007-2013)32 -the exceptions are Group 4, where the highest estimated 
effect takes place in 2006 (before the financial crisis), and Groups 6 and 7 where the 
coefficient is quite stable over time-. However, while in Groups 3 and 5 this high negative 
effect vanishes very quickly, in Groups 1 and 2 its duration is longer.  
 
7. Explaining group membership and time-varying impact 
In this section we assess the role of five types of variables as underlying drivers of the 
heterogeneous impact of debt on economic growth: (1) the quality of institutions (GQIt), 
(2) the composition of public expenditure that is funded with debt (the 10 groups into 
which the classification of the functions of government (COFOG) divides government’s 
expenditure, see Appendix 4), (3) the relative ratio of private debt indebtedness (DQPRDt), 
(4) the relative ratio of public debt indebtedness (DQPDt), and (5) debt maturity (STDt). 
With regard to the first variable, the role of sound and efficient institutions in explaining 
long-run growth was formalized in a number of contributions in the early 2000s, which 
showed that countries with weaker institutions find it harder to sustain growth and are 
more vulnerable to experiencing periods of crisis and stagnation33 (see Acemoglu et al. 
2001, 2002, 2005a and 2005b). However, the role played by institutions in explaining the 
relationship between debt and growth has for the most part been ignored. To the best of 
our knowledge, the exceptions are Jalles (2011), Kourtellos et al. (2013), and Kim et al. 
(2017)) who find empirical evidence suggesting that the quality of governance, the control 
of corruption and the level of democracy are relevant factors influencing the relationship 
between debt and economic growth.  
Regarding the relationship of expenditure composition and economic growth, there is also 
a large body of literature on this issue but, as far as we know, no empirical paper has 
examined the effect of the above variables in the debt-growth nexus, in spite of its 
relevance. In this connection, Devarajan et al. (1996) and Aschauer (1989) point out that 
the impact of public debt on the economy’s performance may depend on whether the 
public expenditure funded by government debt is productive or unproductive. While the 
32 According to Eichengreen et al. (2019), about two-thirds of the increase in the advanced-country debt ratio during the 
Great Recession was accounted for by the cumulative increase in the primary deficit, reflecting revenue losses and 
expansionary fiscal policies.  
33 Good institutions might induce higher investment and therefore lead to sustainable economic growth, and might also 
reduce uncertainty for economic decision-makers and offer incentives for innovative and productive activities.  
17 
 
                                                          
former, which includes physical infrastructure (roads and railways), communication, 
information systems (phone, internet), education, health-care, and social protection34 may 
have a positive impact on the growth rate of the economy, the latter does not affect the 
economy’s long-run performance, although it may have positive short-run implications. 
Therefore, the purpose to which debt is put is highly relevant, since while there are good 
reasons to issue debt, there have also been political failures that have induced governments 
to borrow more than is socially desirable (funding unproductive public expenditure) which 
may lead, in some cases, to public debt levels that are hard to justify.   
With regard to private debt, we should recall that according to the Global Debt Database 
published by the IMF, of the global total debt at the end of 2017 ($184 trillion in nominal 
terms, the equivalent of 225% of GDP), only one-third was public debt, the remaining 
two-thirds being nonfinancial private debt (debt held by households and nonfinancial 
corporations). While the unprecedented increase in public debt and its scale have raised 
serious concerns among economists both about its sustainability and about its impact on 
economic growth, they have taken a more nuanced position on the risks of private debt 
accumulation [Cecchetti et al. (2011), Lombardi et al. (2017) and Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2018a) are some of the exceptions]. Nevertheless, all forms of debt, when they are 
high and moving upwards, are sources of justifiable concern. In particular, the negative 
implications of excessive private debt (a “debt overhang”) for growth and financial stability 
are well documented in the literature, underscoring the need for private sector deleveraging 
in some countries. In this regard, some authors [see, e.g., Schularick and Taylor (2012) and 
Jordà et al. (2016)] demonstrate that high debt levels in the private sector are not only a 
good predictor of financial crises, but also a key determinant of the intensity of the ensuing 
recession. Moreover, high private debt levels can also hamper growth even in the absence 
of a financial crisis, since the accumulation of debt involves risk (International Monetary 
Fund, 2016). As debt levels increase, borrowers’ ability to repay becomes progressively 
more sensitive to falls in income and sales as well as to increases in interest rates. In fact, 
high private debt can have a substantial adverse impact on macroeconomic performance 
and stability, as it hinders the ability of households to smooth their consumption, and 
affects corporations’ investments. So, as indicated in Section 4, we use yearly data to create 
34 Although some sort of this investment might not be profitable from the single firm’s point of view (as private costs 
exceed private returns), the whole economy would nevertheless benefit enormously, which justifies public provision. For 
instance, Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), among others, contend that both government infrastructure investment and 
education expenditures have a significant impact on an economy’s long-term growth rate. Afonso and Halles (2014) and 
Beraldo et al. (2009) show that spending on education and health boosts growth. Finally, Herce et al. (2000, 2001) find a 
positive growth effect of total social protection expenditure in the European Union. 
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two dummy variables representing our proxies of the relative public and private 
indebtedness: (DQPDt) and (DQPRDt), respectively. These dummy variables take values 1 
to 4 corresponding to the low indebted, lower middle indebted, upper middle indebted, 
and high indebted categories using public and private debt-to-GDP ratios respectively. 
Finally, Fatás et al. (2019) stated that one of the reasons why it is difficult to identify 
common patterns and to pin down the causal effect of debt on growth is that not all debts 
are equal;  factors such as debt maturity are key elements that can affect fiscal 
vulnerabilities and the responses of governments to debt changes. Therefore, as a proxy of 
debt maturity, we have introduced short-term debt expressed as percentage of total 
external debt (STDt). 
In order to assess the effects of the different factors jointly, we run multinomial logit 
regressions of the seven estimated groups, using several specifications (see Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1998)35. Table 4 presents classification success data for four multinomial logistic 
regression models sequentially employing different categories of the selected independent 
variables. A look at Table 4 reveals that, except for the indicator of quality of institutions, 
the estimated models achieve a high classification success, and are able to render predicted 
probabilities that are close to the actual percentage frequency observed in the data. 
Therefore, the results suggest that the explanatory variables contain useful information that 
allows accurate replication of the country classification generated by the GFE estimation 
procedure. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
To further analyse the potential determinants of the identified heterogeneous group effects 
of public debt variations on growth, we run regressions of the time-varying coefficients of 
changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio on economic growth by country groups (depicted 
in Figure 3) on their potential drivers. To overcome the problem of coefficient comparison 
when the variables are measured in different units, we use standardized coefficients to 
evaluate the relative importance of the different explanatory variables. To this end, 
following the proposal of Bring (1994), we use the variance inflation factor to calculate 
partial standard deviations that provide standardized coefficients directly related to the 
35 The results of the multinomial logistic regression estimations are not shown here to save space, but they are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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reduction in R2 obtained by excluding the variable from the model36. Table 5 displays the 
results.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
It can be seen that the variable that captures the quality of the institutions (GQIt) has a 
positive significant impact in the relationship between a debt change and growth in five out 
of the seven groups (the exceptions being Groups 1 and 4), meaning that, the sounder the 
institutions, the less negative or the more positive the effect of a public debt increase on 
economic growth. This implies that GQIt has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between public debt and economic growth, in agreement with Jalles (2011), 
Kourtellos et al. (2013), and Kim et al. (2017), who also found empirical evidence that the 
quality of governance, the control of corruption and the level of democracy are relevant 
factors influencing the relationship between debt and economic growth. The variable that 
gauges the relative level of public indebtedness (DQPDt) registers a negative impact in the 
debt-growth nexus in four groups of countries (1, 2, 5 and 6). Interestingly, on average, the 
relative level of public debt is low in Groups 1 and 2, while it is high in Groups 5 and 6. 
These results suggest that the threshold beyond which an increase in public debt has a 
negative effect on economic growth differs across countries (see, e.g., Edberhardt and 
Presbitero (2015) or Chudik et al. (2017)). Specifically, this threshold is much lower in 
countries in Groups 1 and 2 (i.e., the room for manoeuvre for increasing public debt is very 
limited, even when their level of public indebtedness is already low) than in Group 5 and 6 
countries  (where the estimated effect of a debt increase on growth is much lower, although 
their level of public indebtedness is considerably higher). As for the relative level of private 
indebtedness (DQPRDt) it turns out to have a significant negative impact on the debt-
growth relationship in two groups of countries (2 and 5, which are mainly integrated by 
advanced economies, especially Group 5) where the level of private indebtedness is very 
high (see Table 3),  in line with the results presented by Schularick and Taylor (2012) or 
Jordà et al. (2016), among others, who pointed out the negative implications of excessive 
private debt for growth and financial stability. Turning to the case of the relationship of 
expenditure composition and the debt-growth relationship, our results reinforce the idea 
that the impact of a public debt increase on the economy’s performance might depend on 
whether the public expenditure funded by government debt is productive or unproductive 
[see Aschauer (1989), Devarajan et al. (1996)]. It can be observed that, if public debt funds 
36 See Appendix 6 for further details.  
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unproductive expenditure [GF01t (general public services), GF02t (defence), and GF08t 
(recreation, culture and religion)], its impact on economic growth is negative (in four and 
five out of seven groups in the case of GF01t and GF08t respectively). However, if 
sovereign debt funds expenditure in some of the other seven groups into which 
government expenditure is divided according to the classification of the functions of 
government (COFOG), the impact on economic growth is positive in some groups of 
countries. Specifically, the groups of expenditure where a rise in spending implies a positive 
impact on the debt-growth nexus in more groups of countries are: GF04t (economic 
affairs, which includes roads, railways, communication, and information systems, and has a 
positive effect in five out of the seven groups), GF09t (education, which also has a positive 
effect in five out of the seven groups of countries), and GF10t (social protection, which 
registers a positive impact in six out of the seven groups, the only exception being Group 
5, the countries with the highest level of social protection). A rise in expenditure in the 
other four groups of public spending only affects the debt-growth nexus positively in two 
or three out of the seven groups. In particular, a rise in GF05t (environmental protection, 
including sewage system operation) implies a positive impact in the debt-growth 
relationship in countries in Groups 1, 6, and 7 (we should recall that Groups 6 and 7 
include some of the lowest-income developing countries in our sample), while a rise in 
GF03t (public order and security, including law courts), in GF06t (housing and community 
amenities) and in GF07t (health) is associated with a positive impact in the debt-growth 
nexus in countries in Groups 3 and 5, Groups 2 and 6, and Groups 1 and 4, respectively. 
Finally, the higher the proportion of short-term debt, the more negative the impact of an 
increase in debt on economic growth in the seven group of countries (the impact being 
especially high in Group 4) as pointed out by Fatás et al. (2019). 
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8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have used the GFE method proposed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) 
as opposed to a standard fixed effects estimator to examine whether the debt-growth 
relationship might differ substantially across different groups of countries, using a sample 
that comprises 116 advanced, emerging and developing economies over the period 1995-
2016. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to apply the GFE methodology 
to examine the heterogeneous relationship between public debt and economic growth both 
across countries and over time. The GFE accounts for unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity across groups of countries in panel data models, group membership being 
estimated along with the other parameters in the model by minimizing the sum of squares 
of residuals. Moreover, this paper also contributes to the literature by analysing the drivers 
of the heterogeneous impact of debt on economic growth. To that end, we first explore the 
determinants of group membership, making use of a multinomial logit regression model to 
assess the role of five types of variables: (1) the quality of institutions, (2) the composition 
of public expenditure funded with debt, (3) the relative public indebtedness, (4) the relative 
private indebtedness, and (5) the maturity of debt. We then analyse the role of these 
variables in explaining the time-varying impact of public debt on growth in the country 
groups identified. Our paper therefore shifts the focus of research on the long-run effects 
of ‘‘high levels’’ of public debt towards its interplay with the deep determinants of growth 
(institutions and public policies) as the new growth theories have recently proposed (see, e. 
g., Capolupo, 2009). 
Our findings suggest that the relationship between public debt and growth varies across 
countries. In particular, the GFE estimator endogenously splits the sample into seven 
groups of countries that have dissimilar time patterns and a different estimated impact of a 
debt change on economic growth (ranging from -0.43 in Group 1 to -0.031 in Group 7). 
When analysing the heterogeneous time-varying impact of public debt on growth, our 
results indicate that the debt-growth relationship is crucially mitigated by the quality of a 
country’s institutions and intensified by the level of both public and private indebtedness 
and the maturity of debt. The type of expenditure that is funded with debt also influences 
that relationship (negatively in the case of unproductive spending, and positively in the case 
of productive spending).  
Regarding policy implications, our results indicate that the nexus between public debt and 
economic growth differs according to country and is crucially related to diversity in 
22 
 
institutions and public policies that make up the socio-economic environment. Therefore, 
we consider that our results may have some practical meaning for national policymakers 
and international organizations responsible for global economic surveillance, and provide 
theoretical insights for academic scholars interested in the identification of growth 
determinants and factors responsible for the differences in growth in the data observed. 
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Appendix 1. The 116 countries included in the sample 
  
 
Note: The main criteria used by the International Monetary Fund to classify the world into advanced economies, 
emerging market and developing economies are (1) per capita income level, (2) export diversification — thus, so oil 
exporters that have high per capita GDP would not make the advanced classification because around 70% of its exports 
are oil; and (3) degree of integration in the global financial system. 
 
 
Income group Countries 
29 Low income 
developing countries 
(LIDC) 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Republic, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda.  
 
 
 
54 Emerging market 
economies (EM) 
Algeria, Argentina, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Namibia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uruguay. 
 
33 Advanced economies 
(AE)  
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
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            Appendix 2: Definition of the explanatory variables and data sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
Real growth rate (gt) Growth rate of real per capita GDP (annual %)  World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Level of Output (yt) Per capita Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (dt) Ratio of public debt to GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Population growth (POPGRt) Population growth (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
 
GCF-to-GDP ratio (GCFt) Ratio of gross capital formation to GDP (%) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Openness (OPENt) Absolute sum of exports and imports over GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank)  
Inflation (INFt) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index  
 (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
Appendix 3 
 
 
 
Variable  Description Source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(GQIt) 
This is an average 
of the value of 
the following four 
indicators, 
rescaled in order 
that it lies 
between zero and 
one. 
 
 
Government 
effectiveness 
(GEt) 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to such 
policies. 
 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(RQt) 
Reflects perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators  
(World Bank)  
 
Rule of law 
(RLt) 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  
 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Control of 
corruption  
(CCt) 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators  
(World Bank) 
 
(DQPDt) 
Dummy variable 
that takes values  
1 to 4 
corresponding to 
low, low-middle, 
upper-middle, and 
high indebted 
countries 
 
 
 
Public Debt-
to-GDP 
(PUBDEBTt 
or dt) 
 
 
 
Ratio of public debt over GDP 
 
 
 
World Development 
Indicators  
(World Bank) 
 
(DQPRDt) 
Dummy variable 
that takes values  
1 to 4 
corresponding to 
low, low-middle, 
upper-middle, and 
high indebted 
countries 
 
 
 
Private Debt-
to-GDP 
(PRDEBTt) 
This variable is calculated as the sum 
of two components: (1) bank loans to 
domestic households and nonfinancial 
corporations, drawn from the IMF’s 
Standardized Reporting Forms (SRFs) 
and International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) and (2) the outstanding stock of 
debt securities issued (on the domestic 
and international markets) by non-
financial corporations, calculated 
based on securities issuance data from 
Dealogic database. Data are in 
percentage of GDP. 
 
 
 
Global Debt Database 
(International Monetary 
Fund) 
(STDt) 
Debt maturity 
 
 Short term debt expressed as 
percentage of total external debt. 
World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) and  
Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey, CPIS 
(IMF)  
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Note: Expenditure in the different COFOG is presented as percent of GDP. 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
 
 
General Public 
Services  
(GF01t) 
 
Executive and legislative organs, financial and 
fiscal affairs, external affairs; foreign 
economic aid; general services; basic research; 
R&D related to general public services; 
general public services not else classified 
(n.e.c.); public debt transactions, transfers of a 
general character between different levels of 
government. 
 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund)  
Defence 
(GF02t) 
 
Military defence; civil defence; foreign military 
aid, R&D related to defence; defence n.e.c. 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Public order and 
safety 
(GF03t) 
 
Police services; fire-protection services; law 
courts; prisons; R&D related to public order 
and safety; public order and safety n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Economic affairs  
(GF04t) 
 
General economic, commercial and labour 
affairs; agriculture, forestry; fishing and 
hunting; fuel and energy; mining, 
manufacturing and construction; transport; 
communication; other industries, R&D 
related to economic affairs; economic affairs 
n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Environment 
protection 
(GF05t) 
 
Waste management; water waste 
management; pollution abatement; protection 
of biodiversity and landscape; R&D related to 
environmental protection. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Housing and 
community amenities 
(GF06t) 
 
Housing development; community 
development; water supply; street lighting; 
R&D related to housing and community 
amenities; housing and community amenities 
n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Health 
(GF07t) 
 
Medical products, appliances and equipment; 
outpatient services; hospital services; public 
health services; R&D related to health; health 
n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Recreation, culture 
and religion  
(GF08t) 
 
Recreational and sporting services; cultural 
services; broadcasting and publishing services; 
religious and other community services, R&D 
related to recreation, culture and religion; 
recreation; culture and religion n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Education 
(GF09t) 
 
Pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, post-secondary non-tertiary 
education, education non definable by level, 
subsidiary services to education, R&D; n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Social protection 
(GF10t) 
 
Sickness and disability; old age; survivors; 
family and children; unemployment; housing; 
R&D; social protection and social exclusion 
n.e.c. 
 
Government Financial Statistics  
(International Monetary Fund) 
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Appendix 5. Brief description of the GFE estimator  
The GFE estimation introduces time-varying grouped patterns of heterogeneity in linear 
panel data models important to establish whether the relationship under study is 
heterogeneous across groups of countries. The estimator minimizes a least squares 
criterion with respect to all possible groupings of the cross-sectional units. The most 
appealing feature of this approach is that group membership is left unrestricted. The 
estimator is suitable for N big and T small and it is consistent, since both dimensions of 
the panel tend to infinity. 
One of the most common approaches to model unobserved heterogeneity in panel data is 
the use of time-invariant fixed-effects. This standard approach is sometimes subject to 
poorly estimated elasticities when there are errors in the data or when the explanatory 
variables vary slowly over time. Moreover, it is restrictive in that unobserved heterogeneity 
is assumed to be constant over time. The GFE introduces clustered time patterns of 
unobserved heterogeneity that are common within groups of countries. Both the group-
specific time patterns and group membership are estimated from the data. The relationship 
between observed variables and the unobserved group heterogeneity is unrestricted, 
allowing for the existence of correlations that would create omitted variable bias in 
standard fixed-effects estimates. 
Our benchmark specification is a linear model that explains economic growth, git, with 
grouped patterns of heterogeneity and takes the form:                                               𝑙𝑛 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                               (A5.1) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡′  are the covariates that are assumed to be contemporaneously uncorrelated with 
the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, but are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with group-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity, 𝛾𝑔𝑖𝑡. The countries in the same group share the same time 
profile and the number of groups is to be decided or estimated by the researcher and group 
membership remains constant over time. 
In essence, countries that have similar time profiles of growth – net of the explanatory 
variables – are grouped together. The main underlying assumption is that group 
membership remains constant over time. 
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The model can be easily modified to allow for additive time-invariant fixed effects, which is 
our preferred specification37. We apply the within transformation to the dependent and 
independent variables and estimate the model with variables in deviations with respect to 
the within-mean. The new transformed variables are denoted as  𝑥𝚤𝑡̈ = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 −
?̅?𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ?̈?𝑖𝑡 = (𝑔𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖), 𝑒𝑡𝑐. 
The GFE in model (A5.1) is the outcome of the minimization of the following expression: 
 
         �?̂?, 𝛾�,𝛼�� =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝛽,𝛾,𝛼) ∈Θ×𝐴𝐺𝑇×Γ𝐺 ∑ ∑ (?̈?𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1𝑁𝑖=1 − ?̈?𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 − ?̈?𝑔𝑖𝑡)2                
(A5.2) 
where the minimum is taken over all possible groupings α={g1,…,gn} of the N units into 
groups, common parameters 𝛽 and group-specific time effects 𝛾.  
 An alternative characterization, which is based on concentrated group membership 
variables, is introduced for computational purposes. Then, the optimal group assignment 
for each country is given by: 
                𝑔�𝑖(𝛽, 𝛾) =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝜖{1,…,𝐺} ∑ (?̈?𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1 − ?̈?𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 − ?̈?𝑔𝑖𝑡)2                                 
(A5.3) 
where the minimum g is chosen in case of a non-unique solution. The GFE estimator of 
beta and gamma could be expressed as: 
        �?̂?, 𝛾�� =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝛽,𝛾) ∈Θ×𝐴𝐺𝑇 ∑ ∑ (?̈?𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡=1𝑁𝑖=1 − ?̈?𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 − ?̈?𝑔�𝑖(𝛽,𝛾)𝑡)2                      
(A5.4) 
where the GFE estimate of gi is  𝑔�𝑖(?̂?, 𝛾�) and the group probabilities are unrestricted and 
individual-specific. 
There are two algorithms available to minimize expression (A5.4). The first one uses a 
simple iterative strategy and is suitable for small-scale datasets, whereas the second, which 
exploits recent advances in data clustering, is preferred for larger-scale problems. The 
former is used in this paper38. 
 
37 The idea is to control not only for time-variant group-specific heterogeneity, but also for time-invariant country-
specific unobserved heterogeneity. 
38 Very similar results were obtained using the second procedure. 
32 
 
                                                          
 Appendix 6. Brief description of Bring (1994)’s new standardize regression 
coefficients. 
Consider an estimated regression equation of y on x1, x2,…, xk: 
1 1 2 2 `... k ky x x xα β β β ε= + + + +    (A6.1) 
Traditional standardized regression coefficients can be calculated by first standardizing all 
variables,  
*
*
, 1,...,i ii
i
y
x xx i k
s
y yy
s
−
= =
−
=
    (A6.2) 
where ix  and y  are the means of each variable in the sample and is  and ys  are the 
standard deviations, and then estimate( A6.1) by ordinary least squares with the 
standardized variables, being the regression coefficients in this equation the standardized 
regression coefficients. 
The standardized coefficients are interpreted as the standard deviation change in the 
dependent variable when the independent variable is changed by one standard deviation, 
holding all other variables constant. Therefore, instead of comparing changes by one unit 
as in the usual regression coefficients, the comparison is between changes of standard 
deviations. 
Bring (1994) proposes an alternative way to calculate consistent standardized coefficients 
using the variance inflation factor (VIF). In this way, when y is regressed on x1, x2,…, xk 
each independent variable is associated with a VIF: 
* ( 1) / ( )ii
i
ss n n k
VIF
= − −    (A6.3) 
 
Bring (1994) shows although the traditional standardized coefficient is not directly related 
to the reduction in R2 obtained by excluding the variable from the model, the new 
standardized coefficients are. The reduction in R2 is larger when a variable with a larger 
coefficient is removed compared with the loss if a variable with a smaller coefficient is 
removed. Therefore, Bring (1994)’ proposal is helpful in measuring the relative importance 
of a given explanatory variable. Indeed, as Afifi and Clarke (1990) contend, a variable's 
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standardized coefficient is related to the variable's contribution to the prediction of y, and 
the more a variable contributes to the prediction of Y, the more important it is. 
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Figure 1: Government debt-to-GDP 
 
 
 
Note: The sample includes 116 countries divided by the International Monetary Fund into advanced, emerging market 
and low-income developing economies according to: (1) per capita income level, (2) export diversification, and (3) degree 
of integration into the global financial system. 
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Figure 2: Impact of changes in public debt on economic growth by groups of countries 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Time-varying coefficients of changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio on 
economic growth. 
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Table 1: Parameter estimates for the benchmark model 
 OLS FE GFE 
1tg −  0.290*** 
(0.027) 
0.190*** 
(0.018) 
0.286*** 
(0.034) 
td∆  -0.093** 
(0.011) 
-0.078*** 
(0.007) 
-0.072** 
(0.011) 
tHK∆  0.155 
(0.180) 
0.167 
(0.163) 
0.343* 
(0.169) 
tOPEN∆  0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
tINF  -0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
tPOPGR  -0.407*** 
(0.058) 
-0.755*** 
(0.108) 
-0.651*** 
(0.065) 
tGCF  0.075*** 
(0.010) 
0.113*** 
(0.012) 
0.075*** 
(0.012) 
Constant 0.163 
(0.252) 
1.035** 
(0.300) 
2.112*** 
(0.823) 
Country FE No Yes No 
Group FE No No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Group-year FE No No Yes 
Time trend Yes No No 
N 2435 2435 2435 
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.265 0.544 
BIC 12242.68 11753.10 11746.57 
RMSE 2.961 2.675 2.331 
Notes: 
The table reports estimated coefficients from the basic empirical model and its extension to exploring the possibility of 
heterogeneous effects, given by equations (2) and (4) respectively.  
OLS, FE and GFE denote, respectively, results from pooled-OLS, fixed-effects and grouped fixed effect estimation 
methods. 
The dependent variable is gt , the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Δdt i is variation in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
ΔHK t is the variation of human capital, ΔOPEN t is the variation in openness to trade, INFt is the GDP deflator inflation 
rate, POPGRt is the population growth rate  and GCFt is the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP. 
 Robust standard errors in brackets. GFE results obtained with algorithm 1, described in Appendix 5. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Composition of detected groups ordered according to the debt coefficient 
 
GROUP 1: Region Income group  Other classifications 
Public 
indebtedness 
Private 
indebtedness 
Estonia Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU  LI HI  
Latvia Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU  LI LMI  
Lithuania Europe & Central Asia AE EMU  LI UMI  
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia EM    LMI UMI  
 
    
 GROUP 2: Region Income group  Other classifications 
Public 
indebtedness 
Private 
indebtedness 
Korea, Rep. East Asia & Pacific AE G20; OECD  LI HI  
Singapore East Asia & Pacific AE    HI HI  
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific EM G20; Oil Exporter   LI LMI  
Malaysia East Asia & Pacific EM    UMI HI  
Thailand East Asia & Pacific EM    LMI HMI  
Russia Europe & Central Asia EM G20; Oil Exporter  LI UMI  
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa EM    LI LI  
 
    
 GROUP 3: Region Income group  Other classifications 
Public 
indebtedness 
Private 
indebtedness 
Moldova Europe & Central Asia LIDC   LMI LI  
Belarus Europe & Central Asia EM   LI  
 Turkey Europe & Central Asia EM G20; OECD LMI LMI  
Romania Europe & Central Asia EM EU LI LMI  
Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia EM EU LI UMI  
Slovak Rep. Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU LMI UMI 
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean EM  G20 HMI HMI  
Argentina Latin America & Caribbean EM  G20 LMI LMI  
Chile Latin America & Caribbean EM OECD LI UMI  
Colombia Latin America & Caribbean EM   LMI LMI  
Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean EM OPEC  UMI LMI  
Panama Latin America & Caribbean EM   UMI   
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean EM   LI LMI  
Peru Latin America & Caribbean EM   LMI LMI  
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean LIDC   UMI LMI  
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa EM   LI   
      GROUP 4: Region Income group  Other classifications 
Public 
indebtedness 
Private 
indebtedness 
Ireland Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU  HI HI  
Luxembourg Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU  LI HI  
Malta Middle East & North Africa AE EMU  UMI HI  
Dominican 
Rep. Latin America & Caribbean EM    LI LMI  
Seychelles Sub-Saharan Africa EM    HI   
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC    HI LMI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROUP 5: Region Income Other classifications Public Private 
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group  indebtedness indebtedness 
Austria Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU UMI HI  
Belgium Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU HI HI  
Cyprus Europe & Central Asia AE EMU UMI HI  
Finland Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU LMI HI  
France Europe & Central Asia AE G20; OECD; EMU LMI HI  
Germany Europe & Central Asia AE G20; OECD; EMU UMI UMI  
Greece Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU HI UMI  
Italy Europe & Central Asia AE G20; OECD; EMU HI UMI  
Netherlands Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU UMI  HI  
Portugal Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU UMI HI  
Slovenia Europe & Central Asia AE EMU LI UMI  
Spain Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EMU UMI HI  
Czech Rep. Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EU LI UMI  
Denmark Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EU LMI HI  
Sweden Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; EU LMI HI  
United Kingdom Europe & Central Asia AE G20; OECD; EU LMI HI  
Croatia Europe & Central Asia EM EU LMI UMI  
Hungary Europe & Central Asia EM OECD; EU UMI UMI  
Iceland Europe & Central Asia AE OECD LMI HI  
Norway Europe & Central Asia AE OECD; Oil Exporter LMI HI  
Switzerland Europe & Central Asia AE OECD UMI HI  
Canada North America AE G20; OECD HI HI  
United States North America AE G20; OECD UMI HI  
Japan East Asia & Pacific AE G20; OECD HI HI  
New Zealand East Asia & Pacific AE OECD LMI  HI  
Fiji East Asia & Pacific EM   LMI    
Bahamas Latin America & Caribbean EM   LI HI  
Barbados Latin America & Caribbean EM   HI    
Belize Latin America & Caribbean EM   HI    
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean EM   LMI LMI  
Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean EM   HI UMI  
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean EM G20; OECD; Oil Exporter LMI LMI  
Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean LIDC   HI LMI  
Haiti Latin America & Caribbean LIDC   LMI LI  
Israel Middle East & North Africa AE OECD UMI UMI  
Algeria Middle East & North Africa EM OPEC LI LI  
Iran Middle East & North Africa EM OPEC LI LMI  
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa EM G20 LMI UMI  
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   HI LI  
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   HI LMI  
 
GROUP 6: Region Income group  Other classifications 
Public 
indebtedness 
Private 
indebtedness 
Congo Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC OPEC HI LI  
Congo, D.R. Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   HI LI  
Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   HI LI  
Gambia Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LI  
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LI  
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   LMI  LI  
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   HI LI  
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa EM OPEC UMI   
Morocco Middle East & North Africa EM   UMI UMI  
Oman Middle East & North Africa EM Oil Exporter LI UMI  
Saudi Arabia Middle East & North Africa EM G20; OPEC LI LMI  
Nepal South Asia LIDC   UMI LMI  
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GROUP 7: Region Income group  Other classifications 
Public 
indebtedness 
Private 
indebtedness 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   LMI LI  
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC Oil Exporter HI LI  
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LI  
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LI  
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LMI  
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LI  
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC  OPEC LI LI  
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   HI LI  
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC Oil Exporter HI LI  
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   LMI LI  
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa LIDC   UMI LI  
Eswatini Sub-Saharan Africa EM   LI    
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa EM   UMI  UMI  
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa EM   LI  LI  
Bahrain Middle East & North Africa EM   LI UMI  
Egypt Middle East & North Africa EM Oil Exporter  HI  LMI 
Jordan Middle East & North Africa EM   HI  UMI  
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa EM   UMI   
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean EM Oil Exporter LMI   
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean EM   LMI LMI  
Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean EM   LI LMI  
Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean EM   UMI LMI  
Guyana Latin America & Caribbean LIDC   HI LMI  
India South Asia EM G20  UMI LMI  
Pakistan South Asia EM   UMI LMI  
Sri Lanka South Asia EM   HI LMI  
China East Asia & Pacific EM  G20 LI UMI  
Philippines East Asia & Pacific EM   UMI LMI  
Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia EM Oil Exporter LI LMI  
Kyrgyz  Europe & Central Asia LIDC   HI LI  
Poland Europe & Central Asia EM OECD; EU LMI LMI  
Note:  
Regarding income groups, for operational and analytical purposes, economies are divided among three groups according 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification. Therefore, AE, EM and LIDC stand for Advanced Economies, 
Emerging Market Economies and Low-Income Developing countries. The main criteria used by the IMF to classify the 
world into advanced economies, emerging market and developing economies are (1) per capita income level, (2) export 
diversification— so oil exporters that have high per capita GDP would not make the advanced classification because 
around 70% of its exports are oil; and (3) degree of integration into the global financial system.  
As for other classifications: OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; EU: European Union; 
EMU: European Economic and Monetary Union; OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; G20: 
Group of twenty economies that account for around 90% of the gross world product. 
In relation to relative public and private indebtedness, based on public and private debt-to-GDP ratios, we have classified 
them as low indebted (LI), lower middle indebted (LMI), upper middle indebted (UMI), and high indebted (HI), the cut-
off points between each of the groups being the first, the second and the third quartiles.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous effects by groups, GFE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
The table reports estimated coefficients from the extended model to explore the possibility of heterogeneous effects, 
given by equation (4), including interactions of the variable Δd t with the group indicator variables. 
The dependent variable is gt , the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Δd t  is variation in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
ΔHKt  is the variation of human capital, ΔOPEN t is the variation in openness to trade, INFt is the GDP deflator inflation 
rate, POPGRt is the population growth rate and GCFt is the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP. 
Group 1, Group 2, …, Group 7 are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the country belongs to the corresponding 
group or zero otherwise. Table 2 lists the countries in each group.    
Robust standard errors in round brackets. Regression includes group FE, year FE and group-year FE. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 GFE 
1tg −  0.173*** 
(0.018) 
Group1* td∆  -0.430*** 
(0.050) 
Group 2* td∆  -0.227*** 
(0.041) 
Group 3* td∆  -0.143*** (0.016) 
Group 4* td∆  -0.113*** 
(0.019) 
Group 5* td∆  -0.092*** 
(0.015) 
Group 6* td∆  -0.035*** 
(0.012) 
Group 7* td∆  -0.031*** 
(0.022) 
tHK∆  -0.034 (0.160) 
tOPEN∆  0.008 
(0.007) 
tINF  -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
tPOPGR  -0.738*** 
(0.011) 
tGCF  0.106*** 
(0.012) 
Constant 1.199*** 
(0.383) 
N 2435 
42 
 
Table 4: Explaining group membership  
  
Observed 
Frequency 
Predicted frequencies 
Quality of 
institutions 
Composition 
of public 
expenditure 
Relative 
public and 
private   
indebtedness 
Debt maturity 
Group 1  3.41 5.23 3.40 3.39 3.39 
Group 2 6.03 4.62 6.03 6.06 6.03 
Group 3 13.79 12.58 13.77 13.81 13.77 
Group 4 5.18 6.48 5.12 5.19 5.12 
Group 5 34.49 41.94 34.62 34.49 34.63 
Group 6 10.34 10.77 10.33 10.33 10.32 
Group 7 26.76 17.72 26.73 26.73 26.74 
Note:  
The table reports the observed frequency and the predicted frequencies generated by multinomial logit regression using 
the different set of independent variables: second column uses a government quality indicator (GQI); third column uses 
expenditure on general public services (GF01); expenditure on defence (GF02); expenditure on public order and safety 
(GF03); expenditure on economic affairs (GF04); expenditure on environment protection (GF05); expenditure on 
housing and community amenities (GF06); expenditure on health (GF07); expenditure on recreation, culture and religion 
(GF08); expenditure on education (GF09); and expenditure on social protection (GF010); fourth column uses relative 
public and private indebtedness (DQPD and DQPRD, respectively); and the final column uses a proxy the short-term debt 
(STD). 
See Table 3 for the list of countries belonging to each group. 
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Table 5: Exploring drivers of time-varying coefficients by groups 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
GQI 0.0629 
(3.2214) 
5.9607** 
(2.7343) 
1.4718** 
(0.6814) 
0.3112 
(0.4932) 
0.6206** 
(0.2758) 
0.7374*** 
(0.2269) 
0.9234** 
(0.4312) 
DQPD -0.2021* 
(0.1135) 
-1.1454** 
(0.5206) 
-0.5845 
(1.0486) 
-0.5072 
(0.3503) 
-0.4727** 
(0.2055) 
-1.1531*** 
(0.3631) 
-0.0183 
(0.4658) 
DQPRD -0.3127 
(0.7802) 
-2.1802** 
(0.9955) 
-0.5880 
(0.4827) 
-0.6903 
(1.2634) 
-0.1201** 
(0.0529) 
-1.6800 
(1.1079) 
-0.4812 
(0.3436) 
GF01 -1.0025** 
(0.4516) 
-0.5533** 
(0.2586) 
-0.9937 
(0.7920) 
-0.3437 
(0.4127) 
-0.4155*** 
(0.1323) 
-0.5382 
(05174) 
-0.0629** 
(0.0294) 
GF02 -0.7625 
(0.6333) 
-2.2672 
(2.2278) 
-0.9030 
(0.6231) 
-0.3434 
(0.4263) 
-0.2844 
(0.5974) 
-1.5507 
(4.9610) 
-0.5223** 
(0.2396) 
GF03 0.6838 
(0.8313) 
2.3398 
(1.7400) 
0.9353*** 
(0.2960) 
-0.3180 
(0.9615) 
0.4865*** 
(0.1484) 
0.5233 
(0.7981) 
0.2421 
(0.3396) 
GF04 0.1472** 
(0.0660) 
0.4156 
(0.7592) 
0.1894*** 
(0.0608) 
0.0484 
(0.1613) 
0.0436*** 
(0.0141) 
0.9651*** 
(0.2797) 
0.7772** 
(0.3533) 
GF05 0.1481*** 
(0.0467) 
0.1161 
(0.6504) 
0.1549 
(1.1355) 
0.3036 
(0.3014) 
0.2130 
(0.3450) 
0.0652*** 
(0.0188) 
0.2400*** 
(0.0755) 
GF06 0.2010 
(0.5710) 
0.5610*** 
(0.1645) 
0.7055 
(0.7102) 
0.2368 
(0.4750) 
0.3957 
(1.0877) 
0.8469** 
(0.3884) 
0.3440 
(0.3678) 
GF07 0.3868** 
(0.1719) 
0.3300 
(0.8984) 
0.5767 
(1.3004) 
0.9875** 
(0.4631) 
0.0854 
(0.3647) 
0.0863 
(0.5086) 
0.6741 
(0.8329) 
GF08 -1.10329*** 
(0.3415) 
-0.3509 
(1.2218) 
-0.3831** 
(0.1821) 
-1.0951*** 
(0.4081) 
-0.6840** 
(0.3095) 
-5.1393*** 
(1.4080) 
-0.7481 
(0.8070) 
GF09 1.8264*** 
(0.5854) 
0.2727** 
(0.1151) 
0.4180 
(0.7344) 
0.2655 
(0.4506) 
0.0973** 
(0.0447) 
0.7887** 
(0.3585) 
0.2121*** 
(0.0682) 
GF010 1.0632** 
(0.4968) 
4.7131*** 
(1.5204) 
1.1983*** 
(0.4996) 
0.4091** 
(0.1853) 
1.0266 
(0.6267) 
1.2388*** 
(0.3570) 
0.6746*** 
(0.2213) 
STD -1.2967*** 
(0.4027) 
-0.8266** 
(0.3723) 
-1.4838** 
(0.6901) 
-5.7101*** 
(2.2687) 
-0.1532*** 
(0.0483) 
-0.3310*** 
(0.1006) 
-0.0854*** 
(0.0276) 
Constant -0.5777** 
(0.2697) 
-1.1810*** 
(0.3650) 
-0.6644*** 
(0.2741) 
-0.4775** 
(0.2211) 
-0.0.2811*** 
(0.0940) 
-3.6936** 
(1.6563) 
-0.2609*** 
(0.0803) 
Adjusted R2 0.6782 0.6735 0.6888 0.6145 0.6410 0.6964 0.6687 
RMSE 2.1813 2.646 1.8470 4.1703 3.9491 3.7511 3.4540 
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Notes:  
The table reports estimated coefficients from a regression of the time-varying slopes by groups depicted in Figure 3 on its postulated determinants. GQI is a government quality indicator; DQPD and 
DQPRD are relative public and private indebtedness, respectively; GF01 denotes expenditure on general public services; GF02 denotes expenditure on defence; GF03 denotes expenditure on public 
order and safety; GF04 denotes expenditure on economic affairs; GF05 denotes expenditure on environment protection; GF06 denotes expenditure on housing and community amenities; GF07 
denotes expenditure on health; GF08 denotes expenditure on recreation, culture and religion; GF09 denotes expenditure on education; GF10 denotes expenditure on social protection; and STD is a 
proxy the short-term debt. 
See Table 3 for the list of countries belonging to each group.  
Robust standard errors in round brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The bold letters show the statistically significant coefficients. 
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